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#3B - 12/3/91 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SYRACUSE FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 280, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3839 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Syracuse Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 280, IAFF, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Fire Deputy Chiefs, 
Excluded: Chief of Fire and First Deputy Chief of Fire. 
Certification - C-3839 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Syracuse Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 280, IAFF, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: December 3, 1991 
Albany, New York 
i 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, LOCAL 93 0, 
(BLUE COLLAR EMPLOYEES' UNION), 
- —- Charging Party, — 
- and - Case Nos. U-9855 & 
U-10927 
ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
JOEL POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROBERT J. LANE., ESQ., and RICHARD D. KRIEGER, ESQ., 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME New York 
Council 66, Local 930 (Blue Collar Employees' Union) (AFSCME) and 
the Erie County Water Authority (Authority) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
AFSCME's first charge (U-9855) alleges that the Authority 
violated §209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by the following acts: 
1. Instituting Civil Service Law (CSL) §75 charges against 
Frank Max, AFSCME unit president, and Randy Burgwardt, AFSCME 
safety officer, in retaliation for a statement by Max on 
October 19, 1987 that AFSCME intended to file an improper 
practice charge against the Authority; 
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2. Directly dealing with unit employees regarding the 
CSL §75 charges which had been filed against them by the 
Authority; 
3. Coercing unit employees into dropping their opposition 
to the CSL §75 charges and interfering with their right to a 
hearing; 
4. Surveilling Max at work; 
5. Threatening Max for his protected activities; 
6. Refusing AFSCME's demand for statements by two employees 
waiving their right to a hearing on the CSL §75 charges filed 
against them by the Authority; 
7. Refusing to reemploy Max and Burgwardt after the CSL §75 
proceedings had ended because of their protected activities; 
8. Limiting access to Authority property by Max and 
Burgwardt, who were seeking to conduct union business; 
9. Threatening Chris Mulhern, an AFSCME steward; and 
10. Making unilateral changes in investigatory interview 
procedures. 
Under its second charge (U-10927), AFSCME alleges that the 
Authority violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act by determining 
to discharge Max and Burgwardt. 
In a lengthy and detailed decision rendered after several 
days of hearing, the ALJ dismissed all of AFSCME's allegations 
except those numbered 6, 9, and parts of 10. 
The ALJ dismissed allegations numbered 1 and 7 and the 
entirety of the second charge on a finding that AFSCME had not 
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established that the Authority brought CSL §75 charges against 
Max and Burgwardt and then discharged them because of their 
protected union activity. 
She dismissed the second numbered allegation on a finding 
that two employees (John Yonkosky and Dominic Fioretti) had 
constructively dismissed AFSCME as their representative on the 
CSL §75 charges and had approached the Authority on their own, 
without threat or promise by the Authority, to try to settle the 
CSL charges. She dismissed the "direct dealing" charge as it 
applied to Burgwardt on a finding that it was Burgwardt who 
approached the Authority's agent to discuss the CSL §75 charge, 
that AFSCME did not have exclusive control over Burgwardt's CSL 
§75 proceeding and that the Authority's agent had been led to 
believe that Burgwardt wanted to speak about the CSL §75 charges 
with the Authority directly. 
The third and fourth numbered allegations were dismissed by 
the ALJ for lack of proof. 
The fifth numbered allegation was dismissed by the ALJ 
because any statement made about hurting Max financially was not 
made in relation to an exercise by him of his statutorily 
protected rights. 
The ALJ held that the Authority violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act as stated in the sixth numbered allegation when it refused to 
give AFSCME copies of Yonkosky*s and Fioretti's waiver 
statements. The ALJ found that the demand was properly made, 
that AFSCME needed the documents to verify that it no longer had 
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to represent the two employees on the CSL §75 charges, that the 
CSL §75 procedures arose under and were part of AFSCME's contract 
with the Authority and that the two employees were unlikely to 
provide the waiver statements to AFSCME based upon their conduct 
with both the Authority and AFSCME. 
The ALJ dismissed the eighth numbered allegation on a 
finding that Max and Burgwardt were not barred from the 
Authority's premises for any improper reason and that they 
otherwise had no statutory right to access during their 
suspension from work because union business was and could have 
been conducted notwithstanding their absence. 
The ALJ found a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act under 
the ninth numbered allegation. She concluded that Mulhern had 
been told by an agent of the Authority that the Authority was 
watching him and that they were out to get him because he was a 
union steward and an ally of Max. 
With respect to the last numbered allegation, the ALJ held 
that the Authority violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act by failing to 
notify the employees or AFSCME of the nature of the Authority's 
investigation and by failing to permit employees to consult 
privately with AFSCME representatives prior to their 
interrogation. She dismissed, however, allegations regarding the 
use of stenographers and AFSCME's participation during the 
investigatory interview because there was insufficient proof of a 
change in practice. 
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AFSCME alleges in its exceptions that the ALJ erred when she 
dismissed the several specifications of the charges as noted. 
AFSCME argues that the record reflects a pattern of improperly 
motivated actions by the Authority against known union activists 
which greatly interfered with their exercise of protected rights. 
The Authority argues conversely that the record is inadequate to 
sustain the violations the ALJ found against it, although the 
Authority believes that the record otherwise supports the balance 
of her decision. The Authority also excepts to the notice the 
ALJ ordered posted as overly broad regarding the demand for the 
employees1 waiver statements and as otherwise inappropriate 
because no violation of the Act should have been found in any 
respect. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' exceptions, we 
affirm the ALJ's decision upon the grounds stated therein. We 
find the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law, many of 
which stem from specific credibility findings which we have no 
reason to question or disturb, to be internally consistent, well 
supported and correct in all material respects. To whatever 
extent certain of her findings differ from those made by a 
hearing officer under the CSL §75 charges filed against Max and 
Burgwardt, those differences stem from inherent distinctions in 
the two types of proceedings and the dissimilar factual records 
which have been developed as a result. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the ALT's decision and 
order is affirmed as modified-7 and AFSCME's and the Authority's 
exceptions are dismissed. 
In accordance with the ALJ's decision as affirmed, IT IS, 
THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. The Authority shall notify unit employees or AFSCME of 
the nature of any investigatory interview before questioning any 
unit employee and will permit the unit employee to consult 
privately with an AFSCME representative before questioning the 
employee; 
2. The Authority shall provide AFSCME upon demand with 
information necessary for AFSCME to fulfill its duty under the 
Act to represent bargaining unit employees; 
3. The Authority shall not surveille, threaten or punish 
Chris Mulhern or any other unit employee because the employee is 
an AFSCME official. 
-
xWe have deleted on our own motion that part of the ALJ's 
order which requires the Authority to negotiate in good faith 
regarding changes in investigatory procedures in keeping with our 
belief that such orders are unnecessary and inappropriate in 
unilateral change cases. See Middle Country Cent. School Dist., 
23 PERB 1[3045 (1990) ; City of Buffalo, 23 PERB [^3050 (1990) . 
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4. The Authority shall sign and post notice in the form 
attached in all locations ordinarily used to post notices.of 
information to unit employees. 
DATED: December 3, 1991 
Albany, New York 
f±>«^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella,Chairperson 
^» ^ » t w ^ u 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb r 
Eric J./£chmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the•employees of the Erie County Water Authority 
(Authority) in the unit represented by AFSCME New York Council 66, 
Local 930 (Blue Collar Employees' Unit) (AFSCME) that: 
1. The Authority shall notify unit employees or AFSCME of the 
nature of any investigatory interview before questioning 
any unit employee and will permit the unit employee to 
consult privately with an AFSCME representative before 
questioning the employee; 
2. The Authority shall provide AFSCME upon demand with 
information necessary for AFSCME to fulfill its duty under 
the Act to represent bargaining unit employees; 
3. The Authority shall not surveille, threaten or punish 
Chris Mulhern or any other unit employee because the 
employee is an AFSCME official. 
ERIE . COUNTY. WATER. AUTHORITY. 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLARKSTOWN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, 
Charging-Party7 _.._.._..._ 
- and - Case No. U-11333 
CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JEFFREY R. CASSIDY, for Charging Party 
LEXOW, BERBIT & JASON (IRA M. EMANUEL of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Clarkstown 
Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ held that the District 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) as alleged by the Clarkstown Teachers Association, New York 
State United Teachers (Association), when it unilaterally 
implemented a smoking policy which prohibits smoking in all 
District buildings. The ALJ found that unit employees had 
previously been permitted to smoke, inter alia, in teacher 
lounges and employee cafeterias and that the smoking ban was 
implemented without prior negotiations with the Association. He 
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also held that the smoking ban was mandatorily negotiable-7 and 
that the District's duty to bargain under the Act was not 
superseded by any provisions of local law or the local 
Commissioner of Health's threatened enforcement thereof. The ALJ 
also refused to consider a contractual waiver defense because it 
was not raised in the District's answer. 
In its exceptions, the District argues that it did negotiate 
the smoking policy with the Association prior to its 
implementation, that it had a compelling need to adopt the 
smoking ban when it did and that the ALJ erred by not considering 
the merits of its waiver defense. The Association argues in 
response that the ALJ's decision is correct in all respects and 
should be affirmed. 
For the following reasons, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The District's first two arguments misconstrue its duty to 
bargain in the context of an implementation of a unilateral 
change in a mandatory subject of bargaining. An employer does 
not satisfy its duty to bargain, even assuming it otherwise 
bargains in good faith, by simply meeting with the 
representatives of its employees to discuss a proposed change in 
a mandatory subject of negotiations. We have in prior cases 
identified the specific conditions which must be satisfied before 
an employer may be permitted to act unilaterally regarding a 
-'We held aspects of a smoking ban to be mandatorily 
negotiable most recently in Oneonta City School Dist., 24 PERB 
[^3025 (1991) , and Newark Valley Cent. School Dist. , 24 PERB [^3037 
(1991) (appeal pending). 
Board - U-11333 -3 
mandatory subject of negotiations. A unilateral change in a 
mandatory subject of negotiations may be permitted if there 
exists a compelling operational need to change the status quo at 
the time the change is made provided the employer has first 
bargained the change to impasse and the employer indicates its 
willingness to bargain the change thereafter.-1 In this case, 
the District admittedly did not bargain to impasse on a smoking 
ban. Moreover, although it may have had some need to adopt a 
smoking policy by a date certain, we find no requirement of any 
kind under State or local law for that policy to embrace an 
absolute smoking ban throughout all of the District's buildings. 
Having satisfied neither of the first two conditions to the 
privileged implementation of a unilateral change, the District's 
stated willingness to negotiate the smoking policy after the 
implementation of the ban is immaterial. 
As to the waiver defense, the District first argues that it 
is encompassed in its second affirmative defense which alleges 
that PERB has no subject matter jurisdiction over the charge. We 
disagree. Waiver by contract and lack of jurisdiction are 
fundamentally different concepts. Lack of jurisdiction is not an 
affirmative defense and it need not be raised in an answer 
because jurisdiction relates to our power to hear and decide a 
case. Waiver, however, affects only the disposition on the 
g/Wappinqers Central School Dist. , 5 PERB [^3074 (1972) ; 
Addison Cent. School Dist., 16 PERB ^3099 (1983); County of 
Chautauqua, 22 PERB [^3016 (1989) . 
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merits of the particular improper practice charge or an issue 
arising thereunder. Waiver is an affirmative defense which must 
be raised in the answer if the defense is to be properly 
considered. -f 
The District argues, however, that it could not have raised 
a contractual waiver defense in its answer because the contract 
language upon which it relies was not interpreted by an 
arbitrator until after the hearing before the ALJ. We are not 
persuaded by this argument. A party is not prevented from 
raising a waiver defense grounded upon contract language simply 
because that language has not previously been interpreted by 
either an arbitrator or a court. We have stated many times in 
our decisions that we are empowered and required to interpret 
contracts to whatever extent necessary to decide a waiver 
issue.-'' Therefore, we hold that the District was not excused 
from an obligation to raise waiver as an affirmative defense in 
its answer and that the ALJ properly refused to consider that 
defense. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are denied and the ALJ's decision and order is affirmed. 
-'See, e.g. , New York City Transit Auth. v. PERB, 147 A.D.2d 
574, 22 PERB 57001 (2d Dep't 1989), motion to amend granted, 156 
A.D.2d 689, 23 PERB 57002 (2d Dep*t 1989). 
-''See, for example, then Member Crowley's dissent in Town of 
Orangetown, 8 PERB 53042 (1975), which the full Board 
subsequently adopted in St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 53058 
(1977). 
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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the District rescind its 
smoking policy insofar as it applies to employees in the 
Association's unit to the extent that the smoking policy is more 
restrictive than the minimum requirements of the State's Clean 
Indoor Air and that the District sign and post notice in 
the form attached in all locations ordinarily used to post 
notices of information to unit employees. 
DATED: December 3, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. K i n s e l l a , xjh airperson 
Walter-?!.. Eisenberg, Mem' 
^ / N . Y . Pub. Health Law, Art. 13-E (McKinney 1990). 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all- employees of the Clarkstown Central School 
District (District) in the bargaining unit represented by the 
Clarkstown Teachers Association, New York State United Teachers 
(Association), that the District will rescind its smoking policy 
insofar as it applies to employees in the Association's unit to 
the extent that the smoking policy is more restrictive than the 
minimum requirements of the State's Clean Indoor Air Act. 
CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL. SCHOOL .DISTRICT. 
Dated By • • • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE COURT CLERKS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM), 
Respondent. 
SHEA & GOULD (EVE I. KLEIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ. (LEONARD R. KERSHAW of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York - Unified Court System (Court System) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). The ALJ held after hearing 
that the Court System violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it conditioned the 
promotion of two officers of the New York State Court Clerks 
Association (Association) on the officers' relinquishment of 
their full-time employee organization leave (EOL). 
Martin Meaney and Robert Olivari are vice-presidents of the 
Association who have been on full-time EOL for several years. 
Each was promoted in 1989 from Senior Court Clerk to the title of 
Associate Court Clerk. Meaney's and Olivari's appointment 
letters stated that they were required to serve a probationary 
period of between 12 and 52 weeks pursuant to the rules of the 
Chief Judge. By happenstance, Howard A. Rubenstein, the Court 
Case No. U-11420 
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System's Director of Employee Relations, learned after Meaney's 
and Olivari's promotion that they remained on full-time EOL and 
were not serving in their promotional positions. He then met 
with Jonathan Lippman, the Court System's Deputy Chief 
Administrator for Management Support, Michael Colodner, the Court 
System's Counsel, and Amy Vance, Executive Assistant to the 
Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for the New York City Courts, 
to discuss the application of the Chief Judge's probationary 
rules to Meaney and Olivari. At this meeting, it was decided, on 
Rubenstein's recommendation, that Meaney and Olivari must comply 
with the Chief Judge's rules, and the Chief Clerks of the courts 
to which Meaney and Olivari were assigned were so instructed. 
Meaney and Olivari were then ordered by their Chief Clerks 
to report to their assigned courts for service of a probationary 
period. Meaney complied, but Olivari refused and he then 
reverted to his former position and EOL status. 
The Court System has filed lengthy exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision and a supporting brief. The Association has filed an 
equally detailed response and brief in opposition to the Court 
System's exceptions. In general summary, the Court System argues 
that the ALJ's findings of impropriety are not supported by the 
record, that she incorrectly shifted the burden of proof from the 
Association to the Court System and that the remedial order in 
several parts exceeded PERB's statutory authority. The 
Association argues that the ALJ's decision is fully supported by 
the record and that the remedy ordered is plainly within PERB's powers. 
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We hold that the ALT's decision must be reversed and the 
charge dismissed because we find that the facts the ALJ relied 
upon in her decision do not support her conclusions and 
inferences. 
The ALJ found that neither Meaney nor Olivari would have 
been required to serve any probationary period at all on their 
promotion had it not been for their active involvement in the 
Association. She specifically found that neither Lippman nor 
Matthew Crosson, Chief Administrator of the Courts, nor any Court 
System official, other than Rubenstein, had anti-union animus and 
that only Rubenstein was responsible for the decision to require 
a period of probationary service of Meaney and Olivari. It is 
against these findings, which we accept, that the ALJ's decision 
must be reviewed. 
The ALJ's decision makes numerous references to the 
variability in the length of the probationary terms actually 
served by employees and differences in the probationary 
evaluation methodology and identifies an "irregular" 
implementation of the probationary rules of the Chief Judge. 
However, we have studied the record in this regard and conclude 
that, with only a very few exceptions, which were unknown to 
Rubenstein, all employees have been required to serve some 
probationary period and have in some manner been evaluated. 
Service of a probationary period for purposes of evaluation is 
the norm, not the exception, and we are not persuaded that 
required adherence to that norm evidences a violation of the Act. 
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The ALT also relied upon the fact that two other union 
officials, one in the Association, the other in a different 
union, who were then on full-time EOL, did not serve a 
probationary period when they were promoted several years ago. 
Given the ALJ's findings that Rubenstein was solely responsible 
for the decision to require Meaney and Olivari to undergo a 
probationary period, the other union officers' circumstance is 
material only if Rubenstein knew about it. That other managers 
or supervisors within the Court System may have known about the 
two other union officers' promotion without service of a 
probationary period is accordingly immaterial. Rubenstein 
testified that he was unaware of this circumstance. The ALJ did 
not discredit Rubenstein's testimony in this respect and our own 
review of the record affords us no basis on which to do so. 
Therefore, the ALJ's decision that Meaney and Olivari would not 
have served any probationary period but for their activities on 
behalf of the Association is not supported by the fact that two 
other union officers did not serve a probationary period on their 
promotion several years earlier. 
For similar reasons, we do not find support for a violation 
in the fact that Meany and Olivari were not immediately required 
to serve a probationary period by their Chief Clerks. Rubenstein 
did not learn that Meaney and Olivari were continuing on full-
time EOL without serving a probationary period until after they 
had been promoted and he acted to recommend service of a 
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probationary period consistent with the Chief Judge's rules soon 
thereafter. 
In further support of her conclusion that the application of 
the probationary rules to Meaney and Olivari was improper, the 
ALJ cited evidence that employees on other types of leave of 
absence are not required to serve an immediate probationary 
period. Employees who are promoted while on a leave of absence 
to serve in a higher level position for the Court System or 
employees who are on child care or maternity leave may not be 
required to return to work immediately to serve a probationary 
period following a promotion. We do not consider these 
circumstances, however, to be similar or comparable to those 
involving EOL. The other leave periods are finite and the 
employees do not serve in or receive the compensation of the 
promotional positions during the period of the leave. In 
contrast, Meaney's and Olivari's EOL is indefinite. Application 
of the probationary rules to them would be postponed until they 
no longer held office in the Association, a time frame completely 
beyond the direction or control of the Court System. During that 
time, they would be paid the salary of their promotional position 
and their former positions would be unavailable to other 
employees for permanent appointments for an indefinite period. 
Given these differences, we do not believe that the ALJ's 
decision is properly supported by the fact that employees on 
certain other types of leaves of absence at the time of their 
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promotion are not called back immediately to serve a probationary 
period. 
The ALJ's decision also relies upon a finding that 
articulated workload concerns were a pretext. Although the Court 
System alleges in its exceptions that it never raised workload as 
a reason for requiring Meaney or Olivari to serve a probationary 
period, we find that we need not reach that specific claim. To 
whatever extent workload was raised as a reason for requiring 
Meaney or Olivari to serve a probationary period, it was raised 
by persons other than Rubenstein whom the ALJ did not find to be 
improperly motivated and whom the ALJ found were not responsible 
for requiring Meaney's and Olivari's service of a probationary 
period. There is nothing in the record as we read it to support 
a conclusion that Rubenstein, who, the AKJ found, was responsible 
for the decision, made it out of a concern for the Court System's 
workload. To the contrary, Rubenstein1s testimony makes clear 
that his decision to recommend that Meaney and Olivari serve a 
probationary period was based on his felt need for compliance 
with the Chief Judge's rules, not the operational needs of the 
Court. Rubenstein summarized the entirety of his testimony on 
the relationship between workload and his decision to recommend 
compliance with the probationary rules by his statement during 
the hearing that staffing need was "not the issue that I was 
concerned with." Therefore, we do not find that workload was 
properly a factor in the ALJ's decision. 
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For the same reasons, we also find it irrelevant, to 
whatever extent accurate, that Meaney's job duties on promotion 
are the same or similar to those performed by him before his 
promotion. Rubenstein's recommendation that Meaney and Olivari 
be required to serve a period of probation was not based upon the 
job duties of their positions. 
Finally, it appears that the ALJ in part based her decision 
that Olivari and Meaney would not have served any probationary 
period at all but for their union activities on a finding that 
they were given a longer probationary period than they might have 
been given otherwise. Initially, it is unclear to us how the 
first proposition is established by proof of the second. Leaving 
that issue aside, however, the record does not establish that 
Rubenstein fixed the length of either Meaney's or Olivari's 
probationary period. Rather, the record shows only that 
Rubenstein recommended service of a probationary period 
consistent with the Chief Judge's rules. The record does not 
show that Rubenstein recommended any particular period of 
probation for either Meaney or Olivari.-7 To the contrary, 
Rubenstein testified that "[t]he length of the probationary 
-
70n January 1, 1990, new performance evaluation procedures 
went into effect. Michael Burke, the Chief Clerk for Meaney's 
assigned court, denied Meaney's request for early termination of 
his probationary period because of the pendency of those new 
rules. Neither the ALJ nor we consider Burke's action to support 
the Association's claim that Meaney was required to serve a 
probationary period because of his union activities. 
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period is a discretionary issue which is not within [his] 
control, purview or consideration." 
In conclusion, we are not persuaded by the reasons stated by 
the ALJ or from our own review of the record that Meaney's or 
Olivari's activities in or on behalf of the Association caused 
the Court System to impose a period of probationary service upon 
them as a condition to their promotion. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision and 
order is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 3, 1991 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DAVID R. LOPEZ, et al., 
Charging Parties, CASE NO. U-12060 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
DAVID R. LOPEZ, for Charging Parties 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) on an improper practice charge filed by David R. Lopez 
on behalf of himself and several other excise tax investigators 
employed by the State of New York in the Petroleum, Alcohol & 
Tobacco Bureau of the Department of Taxation and Finance. The 
Director dismissed as deficient the charging parties' improper 
practice charge against the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc. (CSEA) which alleges that CSEA breached its duty of fair 
representation in violation of §209-a.2(a) and (b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The charging parties 
allege that CSEA violated the Act by continuing their placement 
in a negotiating unit represented by CSEA which consists of 
Case No. U-12060 -2 
employees with whom the charging parties allegedly have no 
community of interest. 
The Director dismissed the §2 09-a.2(b) allegation because 
individual employees have no standing to allege the refusal to 
bargain covered by that subsection of the Act. The Director 
dismissed the remaining allegation of the charge on the grounds 
that it was untimely filed because the unit placement was agreed 
to years ago, that an agreement to the composition of a 
negotiating unit cannot itself violate the Act, that a bargaining 
agent is neither required nor empowered to unilaterally alter the 
composition of an existing unit at the request of employees and 
that the charge did not otherwise evidence any breach of CSEA's 
duty of fair representation. 
Having read the charging parties' exceptions and CSEA's 
response, we affirm the Director's decision for the reasons 
stated by him. To those reasons, we would add that the improper 
practice charge is grounded entirely upon allegations which raise 
only a question concerning the appropriateness of the existing 
unit. The statutorily defined improper practices do not cover 
such questions, which can only be resolved under the 
representation procedures made available to employees by the Act 
and our Rules of Procedure. In that regard, we do not make any 
determination regarding the appropriate unit placement of the 
excise tax investigators. 
For the reasons set forth above, the charging parties' 
exceptions are denied, and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
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IT IS ORDERED, therefore, that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 3, 1991 
Albany, New York 
iLb.C :haJ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, lrperson Tai 
ki44zz.£. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/"5. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GUILDERLAND CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
UNIT OF THE NATIONAL EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, 
_._._. Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3793 
GUILDERLAND CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding*having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in'the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Guilderland Central School 
District Unit of the National Education Association of New York 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be 
I 
appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3793 
- 2 -
Unit: Included: All transportation, maintenance, custodial and 
cafeteria employees, including 4-hour per day 
substitute bus drivers. 
Excluded: Maintenance/Transportation Supervisor, 
Assistant Transportation Supervisor and 2-hour 
per day substitute bus drivers. 
FURTHER.,._ IT,._.IS ^ ORDERED that .the _ above. named publi.e. employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Guilderland Central School 
District Unit of the National Education Association of New York. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 3, 1991 
Albany, New York 
^auiine R. Kinsella, C hairperson 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Memb 
